Shi'is and politics in Ba'thi Iraq
Shi'is and politics in Ba'thi Iraq
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伊拉克复兴党的什叶派和政治
DOI：
10.1080/00263208508700610
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ofra Bengio
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ofra Bengio
尽管该政权一直不愿承认这一点，但什叶派问题最近已经成为伊拉克复兴社会党的一个主要问题。将这个问题与库尔德人问题进行比较，这将是有启发意义的。库尔德人问题是叙利亚政权面临的另一个棘手问题。什叶派和库尔德人都处于政治权力的边缘。这两个社区的动乱危及该国的稳定，并对复兴社会党的权威构成了挑战。这两个问题由于外部行为者伊朗的介入而变得极其复杂。在这两种情况下，朝鲜政权都将武力作为其终极武器。在库尔德人的案件中，直接对他们使用了武力(1974年4月至1975年3月)，伊朗在国王的领导下，也即将卷入军事冲突。在另一起案件中，对灵感和煽动的来源，即霍梅尼伊斯兰共和国使用了武力。然而，这两个问题在其他方面有所不同。作为阿拉伯人，什叶派发现认同和融入伊拉克政府不那么困难。库尔德人则不是这样，他们形成了一个截然不同的非阿拉伯民族。与库尔德人不同，什叶派在伊拉克现代历史进程中没有形成自己强大的政治领导层；他们也没有有组织的军事斗争或具有明确和连贯目标的政治运动的传统。(1935-37年的什叶派部落叛乱是巴格达迪政客操纵的结果，而不是独立的什叶派意志的表达。)中央政府接触什叶派要比接触库尔德人容易得多，因此中央政府对他们的控制也要容易得多。事实上，该政权从什叶派那里感受到了双重威胁：一是对世俗的现代主义复兴社会党意识形态的模糊宗教挑战；二是更切实的威胁--由什叶派神职人员策划、模仿伊朗动乱的民众叛乱。本文试图评估什叶派的威胁到底有多严重，并评估其对巴提政治的影响。
Although the regime has been reluctant to admit it, the Shi'i issue has of late become a major problem for the Ba'th in Iraq.' To compare this problem with the Kurdish problem, another intractable problem for the regime, would be instructive. Both Shi'is and Kurds have been on the margin of political power. Unrest in both communities has jeopardized stability in the country and has been a challenge to the Ba'th's authority. The two issues were rendered extremely complex by the involvement in them of an external actor Iran. In both cases the regime has resorted to force as its ultimate weapon. In the Kurdish case, force was applied against them directly (April 1974 to March 1975) and Iran, under the Shah, was on the point of being drawn into the military conflict as well. In the other case, force was applied against the source of inspiration and incitement, namely, the Islamic Republic of Khomeyni. The two problems, however, differ in other respects. Being Arabs, the Shi'is find it less difficult to identify and integrate with the Iraqi state. Not so the Kurds who form a distinct non-Arab people. Unlike the Kurds, the Shi'is have not produced in the course of Iraq's modern history a strong political leadership of their own; nor have they a tradition of an organized military struggle or a political movement with well-defined and coherent aims. (The Shi'i tribal rebellions of 1935-37 were the result of manipulation from Baghdadi politicians rather than an expression of an independent Shi'i will.) The central government's physical access to the Shi'is is very much easier than its access to the Kurds, so consequently is its control over them. Indeed, the regime perceived a twofold threat from the Shi'is: one, a somewhat ill-defined religious challenge to the secular, modernist Ba'thi ideology; the other, a more tangible threat a popular rebellion, masterminded by the Shi'i clergy and modelled on the Iranian upheaval. This paper attempts to gauge how serious the Shi'i threat really was and to assess its influence on Ba'thi politics.