SEPARATE SPHERES BARGAINING AND THE MARRIAGE MARKET
SEPARATE SPHERES BARGAINING AND THE MARRIAGE MARKET
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DOI：
10.1086/261912
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发表时间：
1993-12-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
POLLAK, RA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
LUNDBERG, S;POLLAK, RA
本文介绍了一种新的婚内分配模型--“分离球”讨价还价模型。它不同于离婚威胁谈判模型（例如，Manser-Brown，McElroy-Horney），因为威胁点不是离婚，而是婚姻中的不合作均衡;这种不合作均衡反映了传统的性别角色。因此，我们的模型的预测与离婚威胁讨价还价模型的预测不同;在分离领域模型中，现金转移支付给母亲和支付给父亲可以但不一定意味着现有婚姻中的不同均衡分布。从长远来看，婚姻市场均衡的变化可能会大大改变转移政策的分配效果。
This paper introduces the ''separate spheres'' bargaining model, a new model of distribution within marriage. It differs from divorce threat bargaining models (e.g., Manser-Brown, McElroy-Horney) in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage; this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles. The predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models; in the separate spheres model, cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can-but need not-imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages. In the long run, the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium.