Impact of storage competition on energy markets
Impact of storage competition on energy markets
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2018.02.036
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发表时间：
2016-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Cruise;L. Flatley;S. Zachary
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Cruise;L. Flatley;S. Zachary
我们研究如何存储，作为一个价格制定者在市场环境中，可能会在很长一段时间内以最佳方式运行。最优性标准可以是存储本身的利润最大化，其中该利润来自于利用不同时间的市场清算价格的差异。或者，它可能是发电成本的最小化，或者消费者剩余或社会福利的最大化。在所有情况下，对于每个连续的时间步，计算成本函数，该成本函数测量存储器所采取的任何动作的总影响。这样的成本函数的继承提供的信息存储，以确定如何随着时间的推移，形成适当的优化problem.We研究的基础上，特别是多个商店之间的竞争，每个商店的目标是最大限度地提高自己的收入给定的活动的其余部分。我们表明，在古诺纳什均衡，多个商店之间的市场影响集体侵蚀自己的能力，使利润：基本上每个商店试图增加自己的利润随着时间的推移，过度竞争的代价是其余的。我们量化这线性价格函数。我们给出的例子，在整个电力存储和英国电力现货价格市场的数据。
We study how storage, operating as a price maker within a market environment, may be optimally operated over an extended period of time. The optimality criterion may be the maximisation of the profit of the storage itself, where this profit results from the exploitation of the differences in market clearing prices at different times. Alternatively it may be the minimisation of the cost of generation, or the maximisation of consumer surplus or social welfare. In all cases there is calculated for each successive time-step the cost function measuring the total impact of whatever action is taken by the storage. The succession of such cost functions provides the information for the storage to determine how to behave over time, forming the basis of the appropriate optimisation problem.We study particularly competition between multiple stores, where the objective of each store is to maximise its own income given the activities of the remainder. We show that, at the Cournot Nash equilibrium, multiple stores which between them have market impact collectively erode their own abilities to make profits: essentially each store attempts to increase its own profit over time by overcompeting at the expense of the remainder. We quantify this for linear price functions.We give examples throughout based on electricity storage and Great Britain electricity spot-price market data.