The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare
The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare
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奖金税对经理薪酬和福利的影响
DOI：
10.1628/001522112x631998
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Doina Radulescu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Doina Radulescu
本文分析了当前公开辩论的一个问题的影响，即引入奖金税。我们阐明了奖金税对薪酬构成的影响，并研究了其发生率。我们在两国框架内使用委托代理模型，并考虑两种主要情况。在第一种情况下，公司不能在国家之间调动经理，而在第二种情况下，存在搬迁的可能性。我们的研究结果表明，在引入税收的国家，基于努力的薪酬部分总是上升的，因此最优合同倾向于更基于努力的薪酬。此外，奖金税对利润和股息有负面影响，因此责任落在公司股东身上。在没有搬迁可能性的情况下，不征收这种税的国家在福利方面将变得更糟，因为其居民积累的股息收入会下降。因此，红利税可以理解为从全球股东向征收红利税的政府的转移。然而，当经理离职是一种选择时，福利结果可能会颠倒过来。在这种情况下，引入税收的国家的福利低于不搬迁情景下的福利，而不征收奖金税的国家甚至可能获得福利方面的收益。
This paper analyses the implications of a currently publicly debated issue, namely the introduction of a bonus tax. We shed light on the effects of the bonus tax on compensation components and study its incidence. We use the Principal Agent model within a two-country framework and consider two main scenarios. In the first scenario the firm cannot relocate managers between countries whereas in the second scenario relocation possibilities exist. Our findings show that the effort based compensation component always rises in the country introducing the tax such that the optimal contracts are tilted towards more effort based pay. Moreover, the bonus tax negatively affects profits and dividends and thus the incidence falls on the firm’s shareholders. With no relocation possibilities, the country that does not introduce such a tax will be worse off in terms of welfare, as the dividend income accruing to its residents declines. Accordingly, the bonus tax can be interpreted as a transfer from the worldwide shareholders to the government levying the tax. However, the welfare results may be reversed when manager relocation is an alternative. In this case, welfare in the country introducing the tax is lower than in the no relocation scenario, while the country that does not levy a bonus tax might even gain in welfare terms.