Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success, Partial Failure, and Now What?
Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success, Partial Failure, and Now What?
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匈牙利后主权制宪：成功之后，部分失败，现在怎么办？
DOI：
10.1080/19962126.2010.11864974
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
A. Arato
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Arato
本文重构了一种“后主权制宪”模式，即以圆桌会议或多党谈判为核心的多阶段民主模式，包括两部宪法，其间有自由选举，并通过宪法法院全面执行。这是20世纪90年代在南非或多或少得到完善的模式。相比之下，匈牙利，研究的经验对象，被视为一个不完美的实现，因为最后阶段，没有规定在临时宪法，没有完成的民主进程。因此，提交人认为，匈牙利宪法法院的作用是补偿性的，而且由于不完整的程序所提供的合法性背景薄弱，其作用必然会被削弱。一个恰当的例子是宪法修正案的判例。根据继承的修正案规则，只有匈牙利宪法法院按照印度的“基本结构”学说，通过一个或另一个版本的修正案审查，政权更迭的宪法才能得到可靠的保护。本文试图表明，五分之四规则有关宪法的替代，通过在一个不成功的努力，在宪法制定，可以是一个文本支持这样的审查。在这项研究结束后，新的右翼匈牙利议会废除了五分之四规则，采用三分之二修正规则。提交人认为，这显然是违宪的。
Abstract This article reconstructs a model of ‘post-sovereign constitution-making’, namely, a multi-stage, democratic model with round table or multi-party negotiations as its centre piece, involving two constitutions with free elections in between, and overall enforcement through a Constitutional Court. This is the model that was more or less perfected in South Africa in the 1990s. In comparison, Hungary, the empirical object of the study, is seen as an imperfect realisation, because the final stage, not provided for in the interim Constitution, was not completed in a democratic process. The author thus sees the role of the Hungarian Constitutional Court as compensatory, and inevitably weakening, given the weak legitimating background provided by an incomplete process. A case in point is the jurisprudence of constitutional amendments. In light of the inherited amendment rule, the Constitution of the regime change could only be reliably protected if the Hungarian Constitutional Court adopted one or another version of amendment review, in the path of the Indian ‘basic structure’ doctrine. The article tries to show that a fourfifths rule concerning constitutional replacement, adopted during an unsuccessful effort at constitution-making, could be a textual support for such a review. Subsequent to the conclusion of this research, the new right-wing Hungarian Parliament abolished the fourfifths rule, by using the two-thirds amending rule. This, in the author’s view, is prima facie unconstitutional.