A Game for Task Offloading in Reputation-Based Consortium Blockchain Networks
A Game for Task Offloading in Reputation-Based Consortium Blockchain Networks
复制标题
基于信誉的联盟区块链网络中的任务卸载游戏
DOI：
10.1109/lwc.2022.3177431
复制
发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
Ota Kaoru
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wang Die;Jia Yunjian;Liang Liang;Dong Mianxiong;Ota Kaoru
这封信研究了基于信誉的联盟区块链网络中的任务卸载，由于资源有限，任务被传输到边缘计算服务器（ECS）。我们提出了一种新颖的委托权益证明（DPoS）共识机制，其中验证节点（包括活动节点和备份节点）根据其声誉进行投票。激励将声誉和共识延迟确定为决定奖励的两个主要因素。开发了三阶段 Stackelberg 博弈，以共同最小化用户成本并最大化主节点和验证节点的效用。我们通过后向归纳法分析了所提出的博弈中存在的独特的斯塔克尔伯格均衡。仿真结果表明，所设计的激励对于信任管理是可行的，并且与传统的DPoS相比，所提出的共识具有更低的延迟和更高的去中心化性。
This letter studies the task offloading in reputation-based consortium blockchain networks, where the tasks are transmitted to Edge Computing Servers (ECSs) due to limited resources. We propose a novel Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus mechanism in which validation nodes (including active nodes and backup nodes) are voted based on their reputation. The incentive identifies the reputation and the consensus delay as two major factors determining the reward. A three-stage Stackelberg game is developed to jointly minimize cost of the users and maximize utilities of the master node and the validation nodes. We analyze the unique Stackelberg equilibrium exists in the proposed game by the backward induction. The simulation results demonstrate that the designed incentive is feasible for trust management, and the proposed consensus has lower delay and higher decentralization compared with the traditional DPoS.