Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence
Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence
复制标题
关于央行独立性的两个谬论
DOI：
10.3386/w5075
复制
发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Mccallum
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Mccallum
本文对有关中央银行行为的文献中普遍存在的两个基本结论提出了异议。首先，本文认为，这是不恰当的假设，中央银行将，在没有任何预先承诺的技术，一定会表现在一个“自由裁量”的方式，这意味着通货膨胀的偏见。由于平均货币创造率（或通货膨胀率）与政策对周期性扰动的反应之间没有函数联系，因此完全可以避免这种偏差。换句话说，在“灵活性和承诺”之间没有必要权衡。第二，在某种程度上，缺乏任何绝对的预先承诺技术仍然是一个问题，它将适用于一个合并的中央银行加政府实体，以及中央银行单独。因此，政府和中央银行之间的契约并没有克服动态不一致的动机，它们只是重新定位了它。
This paper takes issue with two basic conclusions prevalent in the literature on central bank behavior. First, the paper argues that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will, in the absence of any precommitment technology, necessarily behave in a 'discretionary' fashion that implies an inflationary bias. Since there is no functional connection between average rates of money creation (or inflation) and policy responsiveness to cyclical disturbances, it is entirely feasible for the bias to be avoided. In other words, there is no necessary tradeoff between 'flexibility and commitment.' Second, to the extent that the absence of any absolute precommitment technology is nevertheless a problem, it will apply to a consolidated central bank plus government entity as well as to the central bank alone. Thus contracts between governments and central banks do not overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency, they merely relocate it.