Financial Arbitrage and Efficient Dispatch in Wholesale Electricity Markets
Financial Arbitrage and Efficient Dispatch in Wholesale Electricity Markets
复制标题
电力批发市场的金融套利和高效调度
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2574397
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Mastrangelo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Parsons;C. Colbert;Jeremy Larrieu;Taylor Martin;E. Mastrangelo
虚拟竞价是电力批发市场中引入的一种交易方式，其目的是提高竞争力和定价水平。本文分析了虚拟投标背后的理论，并描述了在何种情况下，它并不像广告。虚拟投标的情况是基于一个过于简化的多结算市场设计模型。机组组合和最优潮流问题的复杂性迫使实际市场算法与理论模型进行折衷。这些妥协造成了虚拟投标人可以在不提高系统性能的情况下获利的情况。实际上，在这些情况下，虚拟投标会增加系统运行的真实的成本。本文以加州虚拟投标的具体案例研究为例说明了这一点，并给出了相应的数值说明。该文件以其他区域和其他情况的经验解释了这一问题的一般性质。本文所指出的虚拟投标的缺陷需要纳入对虚拟投标的成本和效益的任何评估。
Virtual bidding is a type of transaction introduced into wholesale electricity markets to improve competition and pricing. This paper analyzes the theory behind virtual bidding and describes circumstances under which it does not work as advertised. The case for virtual bidding is predicated on an oversimplified model of the multi-settlement market design. The complexity of the unit commitment and optimal power flow problems forces the actual market algorithms to make compromises with the theoretical model. These compromises create situations in which virtual bidders can profit without improving system performance. Indeed, in these situations, virtual bidding can add real costs to system operation. The paper illustrates this with a specific case study of virtual bidding in California, and with a matching numerical illustration. The paper explains the general nature of the problem with experiences in other regions and other situations. The fault with virtual bidding identified in this paper needs to be incorporated into any assessment of the costs and benefits of virtual bidding.