China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Financial Reporting Quality

China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Financial Reporting Quality
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DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2899403
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发表时间:
2019-05
期刊:
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management Research Paper Series
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Ole‐Kristian Hope;Heng Yue;Qinlin Zhong
Ole‐Kristian Hope;Heng Yue;Qinlin Zhong
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ole‐Kristian Hope;Heng Yue;Qinlin Zhong

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我们在中国进行了一项自然实验,研究了具有政治关系的董事对会计质量的影响。 2013年10月,《第十八条规定》出台,禁止兼任公职或者近三年内刚刚退休的党政官员担任上市公司董事。该规定是中国反腐败运动的一部分,并导致大量有政治关系的董事非自愿地辞去董事职务。因此,第 18 条规则实际上削弱了(如果不是完全终止的话)那些先前聘请政府官员担任董事的公司的政治联系。我们的实证分析采用了企业固定效应的双重差分研究设计来考察第十八条规则颁布前后的会计质量。我们发现,与倾向得分匹配的对照企业相比,第十八条规则颁布后,拥有政治关联董事的公司的会计质量有所提高,而且非国有企业的影响比国有企业更强。我们进一步研究了政治关联董事影响会计质量的渠道。有证据表明,关联企业能够更好地获得优惠融资,并且监管宽松,这降低了企业提供透明信息的动力。
We examine the impact of politically connected directors on accounting quality using a natural experiment in China. In October 2013, “Rule 18” was issued to prohibit government and party officials, who were concurrently holding public offices or had recently retired from such positions within the last three years, from serving as directors for publicly listed firms. The regulation is part of China’s anti-corruption campaign, and it has led to a large number of politically connected directors resigning from their roles as directors involuntarily. As such, Rule 18 has effectively weakened, if not fully discontinued, the political connections of the firms that previously hired government officials as directors. Our empirical analyses employ a difference-in-differences research design with firm fixed effects to examine the pre- and post- period accounting quality around the enactment of Rule 18. We find that, compared to propensity-score-matched control firms, the accounting quality of firms with politically connected directors increases after Rule 18, and that the effect is stronger for non-SOE firms than for SOE firms. We further examine the channels through which politically connected directors affect accounting quality. The evidence suggests that connected firms have better access to preferential financing and are under lax regulations, which reduce firms’ incentives to provide transparent information.