Taking account of the actions of others in value-based reasoning
Taking account of the actions of others in value-based reasoning
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DOI：
10.1016/j.artint.2017.09.002
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发表时间：
2018-01-01
影响因子：
14.4
通讯作者：
Bench-Capon, Trevor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Atkinson, Katie;Bench-Capon, Trevor
实践推理，关于应该选择什么行动的推理，高度依赖于相关主体的个人价值观和其他人选择做什么。迄今为止，用于实际推理的基于价值的论证的计算模型需要对其他主体的信念和偏好做出假设。在这里，我们提出了一种新的方法来考虑他人的行为，它不需要这些假设：唯一考虑的信念和偏好是那些参与推理的代理。我们的新形式主义借鉴了基于效用的方法，并以论证和反对的形式表达推理，以实现与基于价值的实践推理的充分整合。我们通过展示如何在实验经济学中使用的最后通牒博弈和囚徒困境两种场景中建立基于价值的推理模型来说明我们的方法，并根据这些实验对我们的方法进行了评估。评估表明，我们的模型能够在计算上再现民族志实验的结果，作为一个令人鼓舞的验证练习。(C) 2017 Elsevier B.V.版权所有
Practical reasoning, reasoning about what actions should be chosen, is highly dependent both on the individual values of the agent concerned and on what others choose to do. Hitherto, computational models of value-based argumentation for practical reasoning have required assumptions to be made about the beliefs and preferences of other agents. Here we present a new method for taking the actions of others into account that does not require these assumptions: the only beliefs and preferences considered are those of the agent engaged in the reasoning. Our new formalism draws on utility-based approaches and expresses the reasoning in the form of arguments and objections, to enable full integration with value-based practical reasoning. We illustrate our approach by showing how value-based reasoning is modelled in two scenarios used in experimental economics, the Ultimatum Game and the Prisoner's Dilemma, and we present an evaluation of our approach in terms of these experiments. The evaluation demonstrates that our model is able to reproduce computationally the results of ethnographic experiments, serving as an encouraging validation exercise. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.