Corporate Board Structures and Performance in the Banking Industry: Evidence from Japan
Corporate Board Structures and Performance in the Banking Industry: Evidence from Japan
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1786200
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发表时间：
2011-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Sakawa;Naoki Watanabel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Sakawa;Naoki Watanabel
最近的全球金融危机有助于认识到银行业公司治理机制的重要性。虽然混合的证据是与董事会在非金融行业的作用，一些分析已经取得了董事会组成和银行业在几个经合组织国家的公司业绩之间的关系。本文考察了2006-2009年银行业董事会规模和构成与公司绩效的关系，以及与金融体系和海外分支机构的关系。研究发现，董事会规模较大的银行在托宾Q值上表现较差，董事会外部董事比例与托宾Q值之间没有显著关系。我们还认为，拥有纳税人资金和外国分支机构的银行将使这些公司更希望拥有一个更大的董事会，因为它们面临着改善管理的要求。在考虑了日本银行的这些特点后，我们发现，日本银行业的董事会结构只有在纳税人资金的银行中表现良好。此外，托宾的Q是负相关的董事会规模的银行与外国分支机构。这一发现表明，董事会结构的外国分支机构的银行可能是代理问题的原因。我们的研究结果表明，日本银行业的董事会结构仍然有待改善，银行业需要做出更大的努力来改变和改善董事会结构。
The recent global financial crisis contributes for recognizing the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking industry. Although mixed evidence is associated with the role of board of directors in non-financial industries, a few analyses have been made of the relation between board composition and firm performance of the banking industry in several OECD countries. This paper examines the relation between board size and composition and firm performance and its relations with financial systems and maintenance of foreign branches for a banking industry during 2006-2009. We find that banking firms with larger boards underperform their peers in terms of Tobin’s Q and that no significant relation between the proportion of outside directors on the board and Tobin’s Q. We also argue that banks with taxpayer money and foreign branches would make a larger board more desirable for these firms because they face the requirement of improving management. After accounting for these unique features of Japanese banks, we find that board structures of Japanese banking industry are well performed only in banks with taxpayer money. In addition, Tobin’s Q is negatively correlated with board size in banks with foreign branches. This finding suggests that the board structures of bank with foreign branches might be the causes of agency problem. Our findings imply that board structures of Japanese banking remains for the improvement and that a greater need for efforts on the part of the banking sector to change and improve their board structures.