Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution protocol with weak coherent pulses
Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution protocol with weak coherent pulses
复制标题
DOI：
10.1103/physreva.71.062301
复制
发表时间：
2004-11
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
M. Curty;N. Lutkenhaus
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Curty;N. Lutkenhaus
最近，Bennett-Brassard 1984量子密钥分发协议的无条件安全性证明已经获得。这些证明也涵盖了在四个信号偏振中利用弱相干脉冲的实际实现。不安全的速率为新的证明或新的公共讨论协议在增加的距离上获得更大的速率留下了可能性。在本文中，我们调查的错误率和信号损失，可以容忍未来的协议和证据的限制。
Unconditional security proofs of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol of quantum key distribution have been obtained recently. These proofs cover also practical implementations that utilize weak coherent pulses in the four signal polarizations. Proven secure rates leave open the possibility that new proofs or new public discussion protocols will obtain larger rates over increased distance. In this paper we investigate limits to the error rate and signal losses that can be tolerated by future protocols and proofs.