Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi
Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi
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马拉维的私人信息和土地使用补贴的分配
DOI：
10.1257/app.5.3.113
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Zeckhauser
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. K. Jack;Hunt Allcott;J. Aker;N. Ashraf;Christopher Avery;A. Banerjee;Rajeev Dehejia;E. Duflo;Rema Hanna;Darby Jack;S. Jayachandran;Paulina Oliva;Steve Polasky;Robert Stavins;Jeffrey E. Zabel;Tristan Zajonc;R. Zeckhauser
当潜在接受者的成本或收益是私人信息时，很难有效地确定公共方案的目标。这项研究说明了自我选择的潜力，以改善分配结果的背景下，在马拉维的植树造林补贴计划。通过拍卖竞标获得植树合同的土地所有者在三年内保持的树木数量明显多于通过抽签获得合同的土地所有者。通过拍卖锁定私人信息的收益代表着实施组织每棵存活树木节省30%的成本。
Efficient targeting of public programs is difficult when the cost or benefit to potential recipients is private information. This study illustrates the potential of self-selection to improve allocational outcomes in the context of a program that subsidizes tree planting in Malawi. Landholders who received a tree planting contract as a result of bidding in an auction kept significantly more trees alive over a three year period than did landholders who received the contract through a lottery. The gains from targeting on private information through the auction represent a 30 percent cost savings per surviving tree for the implementing organization.