THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE KUBA KINGDOM
THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE KUBA KINGDOM
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DOI：
10.3982/ecta14139
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发表时间：
2017-07-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Weigel, Jonathan L.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lowes, Sara;Nunn, Nathan;Weigel, Jonathan L.
我们利用历史上国家集权的变化来考察制度对文化规范的长期影响。世纪初，Shyaam国王在中非建立了库巴王国，与该地区其他独立的村庄和酋长国相比，库巴王国拥有更发达的国家机构。它有一部不成文的宪法，政治权力分立，司法系统，法院和陪审团，警察部队，军队，税收和重要的公共产品供应。将库巴王国的人与王国以外的人进行比较，我们发现，中央集权的正式制度与较弱的规则遵循规范和更大的欺骗物质利益的倾向有关。这一发现与最近的模型是一致的，即当强制执行社会可取行为的正式机构的有效性增加时，向儿童灌输价值观的内源性投资就会下降。与这种机制相一致，我们发现库巴父母认为，教孩子遵守规则的行为相关的价值观并不重要。
We use variation in historical state centralization to examine the long-term impact of institutions on cultural norms. The Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the early 17th century by King Shyaam, had more developed state institutions than the other independent villages and chieftaincies in the region. It had an unwritten constitution, separation of political powers, a judicial system with courts and juries, a police force, a military, taxation, and significant public goods provision. Comparing individuals from the Kuba Kingdom to those from just outside the Kingdom, we find that centralized formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of rule following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain. This finding is consistent with recent models where endogenous investments to inculcate values in children decline when there is an increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions that enforce socially desirable behavior. Consistent with such a mechanism, we find that Kuba parents believe it is less important to teach children values related to rule-following behaviors.