Collusion with secret price cuts: an experimental investigation
Collusion with secret price cuts: an experimental investigation
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串通秘密降价：一项实验调查
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Christopher M. Snyder
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Robert M. Feinberg;Christopher M. Snyder
从Stigler(1964)开始的理论工作表明，在秘密降价和需求不确定性的重复博弈中，串通可能难以持续。与完全信息博弈中的均衡相比，在这种情况下触发策略均衡会导致较低的回报，因为惩罚发生在均衡路径上。我们在一系列经济实验中检验了这一理论。与理论一致的是，不完全信息的治疗方案比完全信息的治疗方案更不容易串通。然而，在不完全信息处理中，玩家似乎决定于静态纳什结果，而不是使用触发策略。在完全信息处理中，玩家确实采取了偷工减料的惩罚措施，这有时会导致后来的成功串通。
Theoretical work starting with Stigler (1964) suggests that collusion may be difficult to sustain in a repeated game with secret price cuts and demand uncertainty. Compared to equilibria in games of perfect information, trigger-strategy equilibria in this context result in lower payoffs because punishments occur along the equilibrium path. We tested the theory in a series of economic experiments. Consistent with the theory, treatments with imperfect information were less collusive than treatments with perfect information. However, in the imperfect-information treatments, players seemed to settle on the static Nash outcome rather than using trigger strategies. Players did resort to punishments for undercutting in perfect-information treatments, and this sometimes led to successful collusion afterward.