Self-correcting STTRAM under magnetic field attacks
Self-correcting STTRAM under magnetic field attacks
复制标题
磁场攻击下的自校正STTRAM
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Bhunia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jaedong Jang;Jongsun Park;Swaroop Ghosh;S. Bhunia
自旋转移矩随机存取存储器（STTRAM）由于其高速、低功耗、非易失性和低成本而成为通用存储器的可能候选者。虽然STTRAM很有吸引力，但它容易受到恶意暴露于磁场的非接触式篡改，意图窃取或修改位单元内容。在本文中，第一次我们的知识，我们分析了磁攻击的影响STTRAM使用微磁模拟。接下来，我们提出了一种新的基于阵列的传感器来检测这种攻击的极性和幅度，然后提出两种设计技术来减轻攻击，即，阵列睡眠编码和可变强度纠错码（ECC）。仿真结果表明，该传感器可以可靠地检测到攻击，并提供足够的补偿窗口（几ns到~ 100 us），使主动保护措施。最后，我们表明，可变强度ECC可以适应纠正能力，容忍各种强度的攻击失败。
Spin-Transfer Torque Random Access Memory (STTRAM) is a possible candidate for universal memory due to its high-speed, low-power, non-volatility, and low cost. Although attractive, STTRAM is susceptible to contactless tampering through malicious exposure to magnetic field with the intention to steal or modify the bitcell content. In this paper, for the first time to our knowledge, we analyze the impact of magnetic attacks on STTRAM using micro-magnetic simulations. Next, we propose a novel array-based sensor to detect the polarity and magnitude of such attacks and then propose two design techniques to mitigate the attack, namely, array sleep with encoding and variable strength Error Correction Code (ECC). Simulation results indicate that the proposed sensor can reliably detect an attack and provide sufficient compensation window (few ns to ~100us) to enable proactive protection measures. Finally, we shows that variable-strength ECC can adapt correction capability to tolerate failures with various strength of an attack.