Computational Study on Strategyproofness of Resource Matching in Crowdsourced Manufacturing
Computational Study on Strategyproofness of Resource Matching in Crowdsourced Manufacturing
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DOI：
10.20965/ijat.2020.p0734
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发表时间：
2020-09
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Takafumi Chida;T. Kaihara;N. Fujii;D. Kokuryo;Yuma Shiho
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作者：
Takafumi Chida;T. Kaihara;N. Fujii;D. Kokuryo;Yuma Shiho
对可持续社会的需求迅速增长。这一趋势需要继大规模定制时代之后的新生产系统概念。作为这些新概念之一，“众包制造”引起了人们的广泛关注。在这样的系统中，每个参与者共享他们的制造资源以实现生态系统的共同繁荣，为下一代社会提供新的价值。为了实现这一理念，重要的是（1）匹配资源请求和资源提供，以实现高效率；（2）引导参与者公平地行动。此前，一些研究表明生产效率有所提高。然而，关于诱导机制的研究相对较少。本研究的目的是为参与者制定诱导机制。关于诱导机制，我们关注两个观点：（a）匹配稳定性，（b）“策略证明性”。这些观点都是市场设计研究领域众所周知的概念。我们之前提出了一种资源匹配稳定性分析方法和诱导参与者接受匹配方案的机制。从形式上来说，当匹配方法是所有参与者提交真实信息的占优策略时，它就是“策略证明”的。然而，这个条件很难满足。实际上，即使匹配方法不是策略证明的，评估归纳的强度也是有用的。在本研究中，我们提出了显示归纳强度的指数（“策略证明的强度”）。随后，我们评估匹配方法，并表明参与者将陈述虚假信息，以在具有资源匹配方法的系统中最大化其利润，以实现整个系统的利润最大化。作为资源提供者，他们可以通过提交虚假的资源使用费信息来获取更大的利益。那么，资源请求者的利润就会受到不公平的损害。此外，受合作博弈论中“核仁”概念的启发，我们提出了一种新的资源匹配方法。所提出的方法基于利润共享减少资源请求者和资源提供者的最大不满（即利润损失）。计算结果表明，该方法诱导参与者提交真实信息，同时保持较高的生产效率。
The need for a sustainable society has grown rapidly. This trend requires new production system concepts following an era of mass customization. As one of these new concepts, “crowdsourced manufacturing” has attracted noticeable attention. In such systems, each participant shares their manufacturing resources for ecosystem co-prosperity, providing new value for the next society. To realize such a concept, it is important to (1) match resource requests and resource offers so as to achieve high efficiency, and (2) induce participants to act in a fair way. Previously, some studies showed production efficiency improvements. Nevertheless, relatively few studies have been conducted on induction mechanisms. The purpose of this study is to develop induction mechanisms for participants. Concerning induction mechanisms, we focus on two viewpoints: (a) matching stability, and (b) “strategyproofness.” These viewpoints are well-known concepts in the market design research field. We previously proposed a resource matching stability analysis method and mechanism for inducing participants to accept matching plans. Formally, a matching method is “strategyproof” when it is a dominant strategy for all participants to submit their true information. However, it is hard to satisfy this condition. Practically, it would be useful to evaluate the strength of an induction, even if the matching method is not strategyproof. In this study, we propose indices for showing the strength of induction (“strength of strategyproofness”). Subsequently, we evaluate matching methods, and show that participants will state false information to maximize their profit in a system with resource matching methods for the profit maximization of the entire system. As the resource providers, they can obtain greater profit by submitting false information regarding resource usage fees. Then, the profits of the resource requesters are unfairly impaired. Furthermore, we propose a new resource matching method, inspired from the “nucleolus” concept in cooperative game theory. The proposed method reduces the maximum dissatisfaction (i.e., profit loss) of resource requesters and resource providers, based on profit sharing. The computational results show that the proposed method induces participants to submit true information, while maintaining high production efficiency.