Evasive Lying in Strategic Communication
Evasive Lying in Strategic Communication
复制标题
战略沟通中的回避性谎言
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.10.002
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Werner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Khalmetski;B. Rockenbach;P. Werner
经济交易中的信息不对称无处不在，也是欺诈行为的常见根源。在一个发送者-接收者博弈的理论和实验分析中，我们研究了对说谎的制裁是否会导致更多的实话实说。在我们的模型中，新的方面是，说谎者不仅可以在说真话和（明确的）撒谎之间做出选择，而且还可以通过假装不知道来进行回避性撒谎。虽然我们发现，当说谎者不能进行回避性说谎时，制裁会促进讲真话，但当可以进行回避性说谎时，情况就不再如此了。然后，明显的谎言在很大程度上被回避的谎言所取代，这完全消除了制裁对说实话率的积极影响。正如我们的模型中所概述的，这种“侵蚀”效应的必要前提是，回避性谎言被认为比直接撒谎的心理代价要小得多。我们的实验数据和对额外参与者进行的调查表明，转向逃避确实可以归因于较低的心理成本。总的来说，我们的研究结果清楚地表明了制裁说谎以对抗利用信息不对称的局限性，并可以解释金融行业的经验证据，即对金融不端行为的制裁最终似乎不是很有效。
Information asymmetries in economic transactions are omnipresent and a regular source of fraudulent behavior. In a theoretical and an experimental analysis of a sender-receiver game we investigate whether sanctions for lying induce more truth-telling. The novel aspect in our model is that senders may not only choose between truth-telling and (explicit) lying, but may also engage in evasive lying by credibly pretending not to know. While we find that sanctions promote truth-telling when senders cannot engage in evasive lying, this is no longer true when evasive lying is possible. Then, explicit lying is largely substituted by evasive lying, which completely eliminates the otherwise positive effect of sanctions on the rate of truth-telling. As outlined in our model, the necessary prerequisite for such an ‘erosion’ effect is that evasive lying is perceived as sufficiently lesspsychologicallycostly than direct lying. Evidence from our experimental data and a survey conducted with additional participants indicate that the shift towards evasion can indeed be attributed to lower psychological costs. Overall, our results clearly demonstrate the limitations of sanctioning lying to counteract the exploitation of informational asymmetries and may explain the empirical evidence from the finance industry that sanctions for financial misconduct eventually appear to be not very effective.