Quality disclosure strategies for small business enterprises in a competitive marketplace
Quality disclosure strategies for small business enterprises in a competitive marketplace
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竞争市场中小型企业的质量披露策略
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2018.03.030
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Cheng T. C. E.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhao Ming;Dong Ciwei;Cheng T. C. E.
本文用博弈论的方法研究了小企业的质量披露策略。在竞争激烈的市场中，有两家产品质量不同的企业在竞争。在博弈的第一阶段，每个SBE决定是否通过零售商向客户披露其质量信息。在博弈的第二阶段，根据选择的质量披露策略，国有企业决定销售价格，或者他们决定批发价格，零售商决定销售价格。我们得到了国有企业的最优信息披露和定价策略。我们发现，在均衡情况下，高质量的SBE可以选择不披露其质量，而低质量的SBE可以选择通过零售商向客户披露其质量，这取决于客户对市场上产品质量的共同先验信念。此外，高质量的SBE比低质量的SBE有更高的售价和更高的利润，即使在客户只知道一种SBE的真实质量的情况下也是如此。然而，当只有一家SBE向客户披露其质量时，由于竞争和信息话语机制，披露了质量信息的优质产品的销售价格可能会低于没有披露质量信息的产品。此外，我们还得到了当顾客的共同先验信念改变时，最优销售价格、批发价格、零售商利润和SBE利润如何变化的结果，并产生了对研究结果的管理见解。(C)2018爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
In this paper, we use a game-theoretic approach to investigate quality disclosure strategies for small business enterprises (SBEs). There are two SBEs with heterogeneous product quality competing in a competitive marketplace. In the first stage of the game, each SBE decides whether to disclose its quality information to customers through the retailer. In the second stage of the game, depending on the quality disclosure strategies chosen, the SBEs decide the selling prices, or they decide the wholesale prices and the retailer decides the selling prices. We derive the optimal disclosure and pricing strategies for the SBEs. We show that in equilibrium the high-quality SBE may choose not to disclose its quality and the low-quality SBE may choose to disclose its quality to customers through the retailer, which depends on the customers' common prior belief regarding the quality of the product in the market. Besides, the high-quality SBE has a higher selling price and will obtain a higher profit than the low-quality SBE, even for the case where the customers only know the true quality of one SBE. However, when only one SBE discloses its quality to customers, the selling price of the high-quality product with disclosed quality information may be lower than that without quality information, due to the competition and information discourse mechanism. Moreover, we derive the results on how the optimal selling prices, wholesale prices, retailer's profit and SBEs' profits change when the customers' common prior belief changes, and generate managerial insights of the research findings. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.