Negative effect of price-matching policy on traditional retailers in a dual-channel supply chain with different content formats
Negative effect of price-matching policy on traditional retailers in a dual-channel supply chain with different content formats
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tre.2022.102682
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发表时间：
2022-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yuta Kittaka;Noriaki Matsushima;Fuyuki Saruta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yuta Kittaka;Noriaki Matsushima;Fuyuki Saruta
我们研究了一个模型，在该模型中，一个垄断供应商分发两种类型的产品，物理和电子产品，通过传统/实体零售商的批发价格合同和在线零售商的代理合同，分别。供应商和在线零售商协商版税率，这是在线零售商的收入与整个渠道收入的比率。我们还讨论了供应商实施以下自我调节以平衡其双渠道供应链的情况：在线零售商的零售价格不低于传统零售商的批发价格。如果供应商采用这种自我监管，会发生什么情况？自律对这两家零售商是否有利？为了回答这些问题，我们首先推导出没有这种自我调节的均衡。其次，我们调查会发生什么，如果供应商采用这种自我监管。我们得到以下结果。首先，在基线模型中，在线零售商对供应商的议价能力的增加有利于两家零售商，但损害了供应商。第二，在自我调节下，批发价格严格高于基准模型。第三，零售商的均衡价格也严格高于基线模型。自我监管总是有利于在线零售商。如果在线零售商的议价能力足够弱，则传统零售商将从中受益。此外，如果两个零售商之间的替代性不高，自我监管有利于供应商。然而，它降低了消费者和社会福利。
We investigate a model in which a monopoly supplier distributes two types of its product, physical and electronic products, through a traditional/brick-and-mortar retailer with a wholesale price contract and an online retailer with an agency contract, respectively. The supplier and the online retailer negotiate the royalty rate, which is a ratio of the online retailer’s revenue to the entire revenue of the channel. We also discuss the case in which the supplier imposes the following self-regulation to balance its dual-channel supply chain: the retail price of the online retailer is not lower than the wholesale price for the traditional retailer. What will happen if the supplier employs such self-regulation? Is self-regulation beneficial to the two retailers? To answer these questions, we first derive the equilibrium without such self-regulation. Second, we investigate what happens if the supplier employs such self-regulation. We obtain the following results. First, in the baseline model, an increase in the online retailer’s bargaining power over the supplier benefits the two retailers but harms the supplier. Second, under self-regulation, the wholesale priceis strictly higherthan that in the baseline model. Third, the retailers’ equilibrium prices are also strictly higher than those in the baseline model. Self-regulation always benefits the online retailer. It benefits the traditional retailer if the online retailer’s bargaining power is sufficiently weak. Furthermore, self-regulation benefits the supplier if the substitutability between the two retailers is not high. However, it reduces consumer and social welfare.