Protecting Encrypted Cookies from Compression Side-Channel Attacks
Protecting Encrypted Cookies from Compression Side-Channel Attacks
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_6
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发表时间：
2015-01
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Janaka Alawatugoda;D. Stebila;C. Boyd
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Janaka Alawatugoda;D. Stebila;C. Boyd
压缩对于网络应用是理想的，因为它可以节省带宽;然而，当数据在加密之前被压缩时，压缩量会泄露有关明文中冗余量的信息。这种侧通道导致了对受传输层安全（TLS）协议保护的Web流量的成功CRIME和BREACH攻击。针对这些攻击的一般指导是禁用压缩，保留机密性但牺牲带宽。在本文中，我们研究了两种技术启发式分离的秘密和固定字典压缩，使压缩，同时保护高价值的秘密，如饼干，免受攻击。我们对这些技术提供的安全性进行了建模，并报告了它们可以实现的可压缩性。
Compression is desirable for network applications as it saves bandwidth; however, when data is compressed before being encrypted, the amount of compression leaks information about the amount of redundancy in the plaintext. This side channel has led to successful CRIME and BREACH attacks on web traffic protected by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The general guidance in light of these attacks has been to disable compression, preserving confidentiality but sacrificing bandwidth. In this paper, we examine two techniques—heuristic separation of secrets and fixed-dictionary compression—for enabling compression while protecting high-value secrets, such as cookies, from attack. We model the security offered by these techniques and report on the amount of compressibility that they can achieve.