Post-decision biases reveal a self-consistency principle in perceptual inference.

Post-decision biases reveal a self-consistency principle in perceptual inference.
复制标题

DOI:
10.7554/elife.33334
复制
发表时间:
2018-05-15
期刊:
影响因子:
7.7
通讯作者:
Stocker AA
Stocker AA
中科院分区:
生物学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Luu L;Stocker AA

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

做出断章取义的判断会系统性地影响我们随后对世界的看法。我们证明,这些偏差可以由一个自洽的贝叶斯观察者很好地解释,该观察者的感知推理过程是以先前的选择为因果条件的。我们通过一组有针对性的三个心理物理实验来定量验证该模型及其关键假设,重点放在一个任务序列上,在该任务序列中,受试者在估计视觉刺激的实际方向之前,首先必须做出绝对的方向判断。被试在类别判断和估计之间表现出高度的一致性,这在最近的记忆相关噪音面前很难与其他模型相协调。观察到的偏见模式类似于众所周知的与认知不和谐相关的主观偏好的变化,这表明大脑的推理过程可能受到普遍的自我一致性限制,以避免对证据进行娱乐性的“不和谐”解释。
Making a categorical judgment can systematically bias our subsequent perception of the world. We show that these biases are well explained by a self-consistent Bayesian observer whose perceptual inference process is causally conditioned on the preceding choice. We quantitatively validated the model and its key assumptions with a targeted set of three psychophysical experiments, focusing on a task sequence where subjects first had to make a categorical orientation judgment before estimating the actual orientation of a visual stimulus. Subjects exhibited a high degree of consistency between categorical judgment and estimate, which is difficult to reconcile with alternative models in the face of late, memory related noise. The observed bias patterns resemble the well-known changes in subjective preferences associated with cognitive dissonance, which suggests that the brain’s inference processes may be governed by a universal self-consistency constraint that avoids entertaining ‘dissonant’ interpretations of the evidence.