Strategies and Vulnerabilities of Participants in Venezuelan Influence Operations
Strategies and Vulnerabilities of Participants in Venezuelan Influence Operations
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DOI：
10.48550/arxiv.2210.11673
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发表时间：
2022-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ruben Recabarren;Bogdan Carbunar;Nestor Hernandez;Ashfaq Ali Shafin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ruben Recabarren;Bogdan Carbunar;Nestor Hernandez;Ashfaq Ali Shafin
对在线影响力运作的研究，协调传播和放大虚假信息的努力，重点关注对社交网络或公开可用的巨魔和机器人帐户数据集的取证分析。然而，人们对影响力行动中人类参与者的经历和挑战知之甚少。我们对 19 名为委内瑞拉网络形象做出贡献的影响力运营参与者进行了半结构化访谈，以了解他们在逃避检测的同时宣传内容的动机、能力和策略。为了验证他们的部分答案，我们使用近四个月来从他们控制的 Twitter 帐户中收集的数据进行了定量调查。我们发现了不同的参与者，包括亲政府和反对派支持者、特工和草根活动家、马甲账户所有者和真实用户。虽然亲政府和反对派参与者有相似的目标和推广策略，但他们的动机、组织、对手和避免被发现的策略不同。我们报告 Patria 框架，这是一个供操作人员记录活动并获得福利的政府平台。我们将参与者策略系统化，以宣传政治内容、逃避 Twitter 处罚并从中恢复。我们确定了与这些策略相关的漏洞点，并建议针对影响行动采取更细致的防御措施。
Studies of online influence operations, coordinated efforts to disseminate and amplify disinformation, focus on forensic analysis of social networks or of publicly available datasets of trolls and bot accounts. However, little is known about the experiences and challenges of human participants in influence operations. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 19 influence operations participants that contribute to the online image of Venezuela, to understand their incentives, capabilities, and strategies to promote content while evading detection. To validate a subset of their answers, we performed a quantitative investigation using data collected over almost four months, from Twitter accounts they control. We found diverse participants that include pro-government and opposition supporters, operatives and grassroots campaigners, and sockpuppet account owners and real users. While pro-government and opposition participants have similar goals and promotion strategies, they differ in their motivation, organization, adversaries and detection avoidance strategies. We report the Patria framework, a government platform for operatives to log activities and receive benefits. We systematize participant strategies to promote political content, and to evade and recover from Twitter penalties. We identify vulnerability points associated with these strategies, and suggest more nuanced defenses against influence operations.