A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1080.0880
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发表时间：
2008-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Nagarajan;Y. Bassok
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Nagarajan;Y. Bassok
我们研究了一个分散的供应链，其中一个组装商从n个供应商那里购买互补组件，并在预期需求的情况下组装最终产品。玩家按照以下顺序采取行动。首先（阶段1），供应商之间形成联盟。第二阶段，联盟在谈判序列中竞争一个位置。最后（阶段3），联盟与装配商协商供应链利润的分配。我们对供应商和装配商之间的多边谈判进行了顺序建模，即装配商一次与一个联盟进行谈判。每一个谈判都是用纳什议价概念来建模的。此外，在组建联盟时，我们假设参与者是有远见的。然后，我们在均衡状态下预测供应链结构作为参与者相对谈判能力的函数。特别是，我们表明组装者总是更喜欢供应商不形成联盟的结果。然而，当装配商较弱（谈判能力较低）时，供应商组成一个大联盟，而当装配商较强时，供应商保持独立，这是装配商的首选结果。
We examine a decentralized supply chain in which a single assembler buys complementary components from n suppliers and assembles the final product in anticipation of demand. Players take actions in the following sequence. First (stage 1), the suppliers form coalitions among themselves. Second (stage 2), the coalitions compete for a position in the negotiation sequence. Finally (stage 3), the coalitions negotiate with the assembler on allocations of the supply chain's profit. We model the multilateral negotiations between the suppliers and the assembler sequentially, i.e., the assembler negotiates with one coalition at a time. Each of these negotiations is modeled using the Nash bargaining concept. Further, in forming coalitions we assume that players are farsighted. We then predict at equilibrium the structure of the supply chain as a function of the players' relative negotiation powers. In particular, we show that the assembler always prefers the outcome where suppliers do not form coalitions. However, when the assembler is weak (low negotiation power) the suppliers join forces as a grand coalition, but when the assembler is powerful the suppliers stay independent, which is the preferred outcome to the assembler.