Sorting and incentive effects of pay for performance: An experimental investigation
Sorting and incentive effects of pay for performance: An experimental investigation
复制标题
DOI：
10.5465/amj.2007.24634448
复制
发表时间：
2007-04-01
影响因子：
10.5
通讯作者：
Tapon, Francis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cadsby, C. Bram;Song, Fei;Tapon, Francis
代理理论强调了当所有者和雇员的利益不完全一致时可能发生的生产力损失。已提出按业绩计薪作为解决这一问题的办法。使用一个真实的努力实验室实验与显着的激励，我们比较了按业绩支付和固定工资补偿。前者通过分类效应和激励效应显著提高了企业生产率。特别是，生产力更高的员工选择了绩效薪酬，员工平均而言，无论他们喜欢的薪酬计划，在它下生产更多，但是，风险厌恶的个人不太可能选择绩效薪酬，对它的激励反应也不太积极。
Agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned. Pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this problem. Using a real-effort laboratory experiment with salient incentives, we compared pay-for-performance and fixed-salary compensation. The former achieved significantly higher firm productivity through both sorting and incentive effects. In particular, more productive employees selected pay for performance, and employees on average, regardless of their preferred compensation scheme, produced more under it. However, more risk-averse individuals were less likely to select pay for performance and less responsive to its incentives.