An econometric analysis of insurance markets with separate identification for moral hazard and selection
An econometric analysis of insurance markets with separate identification for moral hazard and selection
复制标题
分别识别道德风险和选择的保险市场计量经济学分析
DOI：
10.1007/s10614-016-9594-z
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Shinya Sugawara and Yasuhiro Omori
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
矢澤 直人;秋山 英三;遠藤 珠紀;清水展;Shinya Sugawara and Yasuhiro Omori
本文提出了一个简单的微观计量经济学框架，可以分别识别道德风险和选择问题的保险市场。我们的计量经济学模型是等效的方法，用于进入博弈分析。我们采用贝叶斯估计方法来处理部分识别问题。我们还提出了一种统计模型选择方法来检测消费者面临的信息结构。我们的方法适用于牙科保险市场在美国。在这个市场中，我们不仅发现了标准的道德风险，而且还发现了有利的选择，这在牙科保险的背景下有一个直观的解释。
This paper proposes a simple microeconometric framework that can separately identify moral hazard and selection problems in insurance markets. Our econometric model is equivalent to the approach that is utilized for entry game analyses. We employ a Bayesian estimation approach to handle a partial identification problem. We also propose a statistical model selection method to detect an information structure that consumers face. Our method is applied to the dental insurance market in the United States. In this market, we find not only standard moral hazard but also advantageous selection, which has an intuitive interpretation in the context of dental insurance.