Deterring dealer slackness: The role of supplier incentives and monitoring and the market environment
Deterring dealer slackness: The role of supplier incentives and monitoring and the market environment
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.09.014
复制
发表时间：
2020-12
影响因子：
11.3
通讯作者：
Zhikun Zhang;Chuang Zhang;Lu Shen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhikun Zhang;Chuang Zhang;Lu Shen
对于供应商来说，阻止经销商懈怠并鼓励经销商更加努力地工作至关重要。然而，经销商的懈怠在文献中基本上被忽视了。基于代理理论，我们将经销商懈怠行为理论化为道德风险的一种特殊形式。本研究探讨两种供应商治理策略，激励和监控，在抑制经销商懈怠和市场的不确定性和竞争强度的调节作用的作用。通过对中国211家经销商的数据分析，结果表明，供应商激励是抑制经销商懈怠行为的有效工具，而供应商监控则助长了经销商懈怠行为。在竞争激烈和不确定的市场中，供应商激励措施的威慑作用得到加强。此外，供应商监控减少了经销商在激烈竞争的市场中的懈怠。总的来说，我们的研究通过识别一种较少探索的道德风险行为形式并探索遏制它的方法，为文献做出了贡献。
It is vital for suppliers to deter dealer slackness and to encourage dealers to work harder. However, dealer slackness has been largely overlooked in the literature. Based on agency theory, we theorize dealer slackness as a specific form of moral hazard. This research investigates the role of two supplier governance strategies, incentives, and monitoring, in inhibiting dealer slackness and the moderating effects of market uncertainty and competitive intensity. Using data from 211 dealers in China, the results indicate that supplier incentives are a useful tool to curb dealer slackness, while supplier monitoring encourages this misbehavior. The deterrent effect of supplier incentives is reinforced in a highly competitive and uncertain market. In addition, supplier monitoring reduces dealer slackness in an intensely competitive market. Overall, our research contributes to the literature by identifying a less explored form of moral hazard behavior and exploring ways to curb it.