Optimality of a Competitive Equilibrium in a Small Open City with Congestion
Optimality of a Competitive Equilibrium in a Small Open City with Congestion
复制标题
拥堵的小型开放城市竞争均衡的最优性
DOI：
10.1006/juec.1997.2041
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Hatta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nobuo Akai;T. Fukushima;T. Hatta
摘要考虑一个小的空间经济与拥挤的外部性在公共交通部门。我们证明了尽管存在拥挤外部性，但竞争均衡配置与社会最优配置是一致的。为此，我们首先指定一个竞争性均衡分配的设置条件，然后我们找到另一组社会最优的条件。通过比较这两组条件，证明了竞争性分配与社会最优分配是相容的。我们要强调的是，不需要最优外部收费，例如交通管理局收取的最优拥堵收费，就可以实现最优分配。我们的私人拥有和自私的利润最大化的运输公司最终收取的价格完全相当于最佳通行费。
Abstract Consider a small spatial economy with a congestion externality in the public transportation sector. We prove that the competitive equilibrium allocation coincides with the social optimum allocation despite the presence of the congestion externality. To this end, we first specify a set up conditions for a competitive equilibrium allocation, and then we find another set of conditions for social optimality. By comparing the two set of conditions, we prove that the competitive allocation is compatible with the social optimal allocation. We would like to emphasize the fact that no optimal external toll, such as the optimal congestion toll collected by a transportation authority, is required to attain the optimal allocation. Our privately owned and selfish profit maximizing transportation companies end up with charging the price exactly equivalent to the optimal toll.