Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Re-Election Concerns
Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Re-Election Concerns
复制标题
选举总是能激励现任者吗？
DOI：
10.1007/s11127-006-0863-6
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Ben Lockwood
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Eric Le Borgne;Ben Lockwood
本文研究了官员和选民之间关系的委托代理模型，在该模型中，每个人最初都不知道官员的能力。如果官员的努力和能力在决定其在办公室的表现时相互作用，那么官员就有学习的动机，即提高努力，使绩效成为其能力的更准确的信号。选举减少了学习效应，而这种效应的减少可能会超过抵消选举对努力的积极“连任担忧”的影响，这意味着更大的努力和任命。当这种情况发生时，任命官员可能会在福利选举中占据主导地位。
This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive tolearn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive “re-election concerns” effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.