A Note on Local Public Good Induced Spillovers between a Leading and a Lagging Region
A Note on Local Public Good Induced Spillovers between a Leading and a Lagging Region
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关于地方公共物品引发的领先地区与落后地区之间的溢出效应的注解
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3189098
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发表时间:
2018
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
A. Batabyal
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
A. Batabyal
We analyze spatial spillovers in an aggregate economy consisting of a leading and a lagging region where the spillovers stem from the provision of a local public good. Specifically, if the leading region provides the public good then the lagging region obtains some spillover benefits and vice versa. We first solve for the Nash equilibrium levels of the local public goods in the two regions when public investment decisions are simultaneous; next, we determine the equilibrium welfare levels in each region. Second, on the assumption that the public investment decisions are centralized, we compute the levels of the local public goods that maximize aggregate welfare. Finally, we describe an interregional transfer scheme that leads each region to choose non-cooperatively in a Nash equilibrium the same public investment levels as those that arise when aggregate welfare is maximized.