Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies
Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies
复制标题
独立输电公司的价格监管
DOI：
10.1023/a:1011103328722
复制
发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
I. Vogelsang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
I. Vogelsang
本文在独立输电公司(Transco)的背景下，研究了输电价格结构调整的方法。重点是两部分收费，其中可变部分将反映拥堵费用(和辅助服务)，而固定部分将反映运力成本。由两部分组成的关税形成了价格上限指数，只要该指数满足价格上限限制，该公司就可以重新平衡价格。然后，该公司将有动机在拥堵和产能扩张之间进行权衡，以便每当拥堵成本平均超过扩张成本时，扩张就变得有利可图。然而，有了连锁的Laspeyres权重，价格上限指数的扩张可能不是最优的。因此，我们讨论了提高膨胀系数的方法。实施所考虑的监管方案建议采取一种混合办法，将交易公司与独立的系统运营商(ISO)结合起来。
This paper considers methods of price structure regulation of electricity transmission in the context of an independent transmission company (TRANSCO). The focus is on two-part tariffs where the variable part would reflect congestion charges (and ancillary services) while the fixed part would reflect capacity costs. The two-part tariffs form a price-cap index, and the firm could rebalance prices, as long as the index satisfies the price-cap constraint. The firm would then have incentives to trade off congestion against capacity expansion in such a way that it becomes profitable to expand, whenever the costs of congestion on average exceed the costs of expansion. However, with chained Laspeyres weights in the price-cap index expansion may be suboptimal. We therefore discuss ways to improve the expansion factor. Implementing the regulatory schemes considered suggests a hybrid approach combining a TRANSCO with an independent system operator (ISO).