THE LOTTERY PARADOX AND OUR EPISTEMIC GOAL
THE LOTTERY PARADOX AND OUR EPISTEMIC GOAL
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彩票悖论和我们的认知目标
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
I. Douven
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
I. Douven
当前位置许多人有一种直觉，即对彩票骗局的正确反应是否认人们可以毫无疑问地相信即使是一张彩票也会输。本文表明，从任何根据这种直觉解决悖论的证明理论中，可以推导出一种不属于这种类型的理论，这种理论也解决了悖论，但比前者更有利于我们的认识目标。有人认为，目前没有正当理由不优先考虑派生账户而不是它们所来自的账户。
: Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no valid reason not to give preference to the derived accounts over the accounts from which they come.