Direct perception in the intersubjective context

Direct perception in the intersubjective context
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DOI:
10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.003
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发表时间:
2008-06-01
影响因子:
2.4
通讯作者:
Gallagher, Shaun
Gallagher, Shaun
中科院分区:
心理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Gallagher, Shaun

文献摘要

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本文反对心理学和认知科学中关于社会认知的标准理论,认为直接知觉在社会认知中起着重要作用。两个占主导地位的理论,理论理论(TT)和模拟理论(ST),都认为我们理解他人的能力所必需的不仅仅是感知元素,即,“mindread”或“mentalize”。“相比之下,某些现象学方法在很大程度上依赖于感知的概念以及我们对他人的意图、感受等有直接感知把握的想法。本文准确地解释了直接感知概念的含义,提供了证据发展研究,并提出了对镜像系统神经科学的非模拟主义解释。(C)2008年爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to "mindread" or "mentalize." In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and the idea that we have a direct perceptual grasp of the other person's intentions, feelings, etc. This paper explains precisely what the notion of direct perception means, offers evidence from developmental studies, and proposes a non-simulationist interpretation of the neuroscience of mirror systems. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.