Bank Bailouts and Aggregate Liquidity
Bank Bailouts and Aggregate Liquidity
复制标题
银行救助和总体流动性
DOI：
10.1257/000282802320188961
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Rajan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Douglas W. Diamond;R. Rajan
政府有时会通过调整银行资本结构或为其债务提供保险来救助银行。政府的目标可能是拯救借款人、银行家或储户，经济学家已经提出了为什么这些选区都值得保护的理由（例如，Diamond，2001）。这些潜在的好处必须与救助的成本进行权衡，后者通常被认为是对这种干预所产生的长期激励的损害。在本文中，我们提出了一个不同的影响银行救助：银行救助改变了经济中的总流动性的可用性。虽然目标明确的救助可以帮助拯救崩溃的银行系统（见Diamond和Rajan，2001 a），但目标不明确的救助甚至可能使银行系统陷入系统性危机。据我们所知，这种（危机后的）银行救助成本在其他地方还没有被研究过，这是本文的重点。
Governments sometimes bail out banks by recapitalizing them, or by offering to insure their liabilities. The government’s goal may be to rescue borrowers, bankers, or depositors, and economists have developed rationales why each of these constituencies may merit protection (e.g., Diamond, 2001). These potential benefits have to be weighed against the costs of a bailout, which are typically thought to be the damage to long-run incentives that such intervention engenders. In this paper, we present a different effect of bank bailouts: Bank bailouts alter the availability of aggregate liquidity in the economy. While a well-targeted bailout can help rescue an otherwise collapsing banking system (see Diamond and Rajan, 2001a), a poorly targeted bailout can even tip a banking system into a systemic crisis. This (ex post crisis) cost of bank bailouts, to the best of our knowledge, has not been examined elsewhere and is the focus of this paper.