Competition and disclosure incentives: an empirical study of HMOs.
Competition and disclosure incentives: an empirical study of HMOs.
复制标题
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Jin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Jin
我研究了健康维护组织（HMO）自愿披露的产品质量，这是不完整的解开理论预测。在控制了成本和需求因素后，我发现HMO使用自愿披露来区别于竞争对手，在竞争激烈的市场中披露率较低。这些研究结果与产品差异化是一致的，但挑战了竞争应导致提供更多高质量信息的直觉。
I examine Health Maintenance Organizations' (HMOs) voluntary disclosure of product quality, which is not as complete as unraveling theories predict. After controlling for cost and demand factors, I find that HMOs use voluntary disclosure to differentiate from competitors, with lower disclosure rates in highly competitive markets. These findings are consistent with product differentiation, but challenge the intuition that competition should lead to more provision of quality information.