Induction and other minds
Induction and other minds
复制标题
归纳法和其他思想
DOI：
10.1080/00048407412341001
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发表时间：
1974
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
G. Schlesinger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Schlesinger
其他心灵之所以存在，是因为其他人拥有与我相似的身体——因为其他人也表现出各种各样的行为，在我自己的情况下，这些行为是各种内心体验的标志——这一论点有着悠久而杰出的历史。即使在今天，许多哲学家仍把这一论点视为确立精神状态归属于他人的最可靠的手段。在这里，我建议仔细检查归纳论证的结构和基础，以显示其他心灵的存在。最后，我将对归纳法进行一般性的审查。我的研究结果表明，利用归纳法来确立他人心理状态存在的整个尝试，可能是基于对归纳法本质的误解。
The argument that other minds exist because others have bodies similar to mine--and because others also exhibit various sorts of behaviour which in my own case are signs of various inner experiences-has a long and distinguished history. Even today many philosophers regard this argument as the firmest means whereby the ascription of mental states to others is established.Here I propose to examine closely the structure and foundations of the inductive argument designed to show the existence of other minds. Finally, I shall subject the inductive method in general to scrutiny. My results suggest that the whole attempt to employ induction to establish the existence of mental states in others may be based on a misconception of the nature of induction.