Audit committees’ oversight of bank risk-taking
Audit committees’ oversight of bank risk-taking
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审计委员会对银行风险承担的监督
DOI：
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.12.015
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Guoping Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jerry Sun;Guoping Liu
本研究探讨审计委员会的有效性是否会影响银行的风险承担和风险管理的有效性。研究发现，审计委员会任期较长的银行总体风险和特质风险较低，而审计委员会中董事忙碌的银行总体风险和特质风险较高。这表明，审计委员会的高效率可能会限制银行的冒险活动。我们还发现，公司业绩与银行风险更积极的银行董事会任期长，更多的女性审计委员会成员，或大规模的审计委员会比其他银行，审计委员会的有效性可能会增加风险管理的有效性的概念相一致。然而，这一发现应谨慎解释，因为它是相反的审计委员会忙碌的结果。
This study examines whether audit committee effectiveness affects bank risk-taking and risk management effectiveness. We find that banks with long board tenure audit committees have lower total risk and idiosyncratic risk, and banks with busy directors on their audit committees have higher total risk and idiosyncratic risk. These suggest that high audit committee effectiveness may constrain bank risk-taking activities. We also find that firm performance is more positively associated with bank risk for banks with long board tenure, more female audit committee members, or large size audit committees than for other banks, consistent with the notion that audit committee effectiveness may increase risk management effectiveness. However, this finding should be interpreted cautiously as it is contrary to the results on audit committee busyness.