tragedy of the commons
tragedy of the commons
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DOI：
10.4135/9781483359878.n666
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发表时间：
2010-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Elinor Ostrom;Steven N. Durlauf;L. Blume
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Elinor Ostrom;Steven N. Durlauf;L. Blume
"公地悲剧“的出现是因为将潜在使用者排除在产生有限利益流的公共资源之外既困难又代价高昂，结果这些资源将被理性的、追求效用最大化的个人耗尽，而不是为所有人的利益而保存。对用户自愿合作以防止过度使用的可能性的悲观情绪导致了对公共池资源的广泛集中控制。但这种控制本身往往导致资源过度使用。在实践中，特别是在他们可以交流的地方，用户经常制定限制资源使用和保护资源的规则。
‘The tragedy of the commons’ arises when it is difficult and costly to exclude potential users from common-pool resources that yield finite flows of benefits, as a result of which those resources will be exhausted by rational, utility-maximizing individuals rather than conserved for the benefit of all. Pessimism about the possibility of users voluntarily cooperating to prevent overuse has led to widespread central control of common-pool resources. But such control has itself frequently resulted in resource overuse. In practice, especially where they can communicate, users often develop rules that limit resource use and conserve resources.