Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits
Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits
复制标题
立法共同池的资历和反竞争限制：保有权对立法总体产出和政治利益集中的影响
DOI：
10.1007/s11127-011-9780-4
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Ryan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Sobel;M. Ryan
众所周知，地理区域受益于它们所占的政府支出份额，因为有一位任期更长的立法者，让其他立法者的任期保持不变。然而，对于如果所有成员都获得资历，立法的总产出将如何变化，这一文献的含义不太清楚。国会中资历的增加和分散会产生一种类似卡特尔的效应，即立法者限制立法的数量，并提高每一项通过的法案的平均价格。这一分析为衡量国会委员会制度出现的影响提供了一个自然的实验。
It is well established that geographic areas benefit, in terms of the share of government spending they capture, from having a legislator with longer tenure,holding constantthe tenure of other legislators. However, the implications of this literature for how the total production of legislation changes ifallmembers gained seniority is less clear. Increased levels and dispersion of seniority within Congress generate a cartel-like effect, whereby legislators restrict the quantity of legislation enacted and increase the average price of each passed bill. The analysis provides a natural experiment to gauge the impacts of the emergence of the congressional committee system.