Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach
Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach
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作者：
Takaaki Abe
在本文中，我们使用配分函数形式的博弈来分析古诺竞争中企业之间卡特尔的形成。我们假设一家公司获得了一定的成本优势，使其能够以较低的单位成本生产商品。我们表明，如果成本优势水平为“中等”，那么具有成本优势的企业将主导企业之间的卡特尔形成。而且，如果成本优势比较高，那么形成的卡特尔也可以是配分函数形式博弈核心意义上的稳定。我们还表明，如果低成本生产的技术可以被复制，那么成本优势可能会阻止卡特尔分裂。
In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is “moderate”, then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting.