Social preference and civil society in the institutional analysis of capitalisms: an attempt to integrate Samuel Bowles’ The Moral Economy and Robert Boyer’s Regulation Theory

Social preference and civil society in the institutional analysis of capitalisms: an attempt to integrate Samuel Bowles’ The Moral Economy and Robert Boyer’s Regulation Theory
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资本主义制度分析中的社会偏好和公民社会:整合塞缪尔·鲍尔斯的道德经济和罗伯特·博耶的规制理论的尝试

DOI:
10.1007/s40844-019-00141-5
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
Eolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Hiroyasu Uemura
Hiroyasu Uemura
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
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作者:
Takahiro Akita;Awaludin Aji Riadi and Ali Rizal;橋本浩幸・内藤徹;Hiroyasu Uemura

文献摘要

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塞缪尔·鲍尔斯在《道德经济学》中提出的“市民社会偏好”和罗伯特·博耶在《教育理论》中提出的“市民社会”,体现了对现代社会和资本主义的深刻理解。在本文中,他们的理论之间的差异和可能的互补关系进行了审议。首先,有必要了解市场经济内外的多层次机构和行动者形成公民社会偏好的过程。公民的社会偏好有可能以一种补充市场经济的方式发展,如鲍尔斯所建议的那样,得到法治和自由机构以及调节理论中的“公民社会”的支持。这种理解在合同不完整的劳动力市场中尤其重要。第二,必须在微观和宏观两级对公民偏好的形成进行补充分析。在鲍尔斯的理论框架中,法治和公民制度通过降低市场风险促进公民社会偏好的发展,而市场风险和收入分配是由宏观经济动态决定的,正如调节理论所指出的那样。第三,有必要分析立法者和公民之间的民主进程,这是由政治和经济领域的动态反馈决定的。正如博耶的“公民社会民主”所指出的那样,在以公民意识和民主促进决策者偏好的过程中,公民的政治参与发挥着重要作用。
Samuel Bowles’ “civic social preference” inThe Moral Economyand Robert Boyer’s “civil society” in therégulationtheory show in-depth understanding of modern society and capitalism. In this paper, the difference between their theories and possible complementary relationships are considered. First, it is necessary to understand the formation of civic social preferences with multi-layered institutions and actors both inside and outside the market economy. Citizens’ social preferences can potentially develop in a way that complements the market economy, supported by the rule of law and liberal institutions, as suggested by Bowles, as well as “civil society” in therégulationtheory. This understanding is particularly important in the labor market with incomplete contracts. Second, it is necessary to develop complementary analyses of the formation of citizens’ preferences at the micro- and macro-levels. In Bowles’ framework, the rule of law and civic institutions promote the development of civic social preferences by reducing market risks, and market risks and income distribution are determined by macroeconomic dynamics, as suggested by therégulationtheory. Third, it is necessary to analyze democratic processes between legislators and citizens that are determined by the dynamic feedback of the political and economic domains. In promoting policymakers’ preferences with the appreciation of citizenship and democracy, the political participation of citizens plays an important role, as suggested in Boyer’s “civic social democracy.”