Lifeblood
Lifeblood
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命脉
DOI：
10.1093/oso/9780198836810.003.0006
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Normore
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Deborah J. Brown;C. Normore
在将生命等同于拥有灵魂的亚里士多德-经院哲学中，解释生物和非生物之间的区别没有特别的问题。笛卡尔经常提到生物和生与死的区别，将后者等同于自动机工作和不工作之间的区别。这就产生了一个问题：笛卡尔对生者和死者的区分究竟有多强？人工生命的可能性有多真实的？我们是否应该得出结论，时钟是活的？本章考察了对笛卡尔哲学中的“生命”进行分析的四种尝试，发现每一种尝试都有不足之处。有人认为，要理解笛卡尔的“生命”意味着什么，最好的办法就是看看死亡所涉及的东西--一个自动机在其持续时间内维持和滋养它的过程中逐渐淤塞。
In Aristotelian-Scholastic accounts that equated life with the possession of a soul, there is no particular problem explaining the distinction between living and non-living things. Descartes makes frequent references to living things and to the distinction between life and death, equating the latter to the difference between an automaton working and one that is not. The question arises how robust is the distinction between the living and the dead for Descartes? How real is the possibility of artificial life? Should we conclude that a clock is alive? This chapter examines four attempts to give an analysis of “life” in Descartes’ philosophy and finds each wanting. It is argued that the best one can do to understand what “life” means for Descartes is to look at what death involves—the gradual silting up of an automaton through the very processes that for its duration sustain and nourish it.