Properties as Individuals in Formal Ontology
Properties as Individuals in Formal Ontology
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形式本体论中作为个体的属性
DOI：
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发表时间：
1972
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Cocchiarella
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作者：
N. Cocchiarella
罗素假定的预测悖论偶尔被引用为本体论课程的来源。例如，格罗斯曼在b[6]中指出，罗素悖论的教训之一是，不存在复杂性质。然而，最近对假定悖论的重新评估使我得出结论，即不存在悖论（参见b[3]）。当然，没有悖论的地方，也就没有悖论的教训。然而，可能有非悖论的教训，特别是如果结果不是矛盾，而是一种极具启发性的本体论怪异。在接下来的内容中，我将简要回顾一下导致我得出结论的考虑，即没有悖论，而只是这种本体论上的奇怪现象，它本身具有指导性的教训，当然与它发生的本体论框架有关。然后，我将简要地考虑几种对这种奇异现象作出反应的方式，其中每一种反应都以另一种本体论框架为前提，这种反应要么表明它建立在一个本体论错误上，就像格罗斯曼的反应一样，要么通过声称比奇异现象发生的原始框架更深入或更广泛的框架来减轻其影响。
Russell's supposed paradox of predication has occasionally been cited as a source for lessons in ontology. So, for example, Grossmann in [6] has argued that one of the lessons of Russell's paradox is that there are no complex properties. A recent reevaluation of the supposed paradox, however, has led me to the conclusion that there is no paradox (cf. [3]). And of course where there is no paradox, there are no lessons of paradox. There may, however, be lessons of non-paradox, especially if instead of contradiction what results is a highly instructive ontological oddity. In what follows I shall briefly review the considerations that led me to conclude that there is no paradox but instead only this ontological oddity with instructive lessons of its own, relative of course to the ontological framework within which it occurs. I shall then briefly consider several ways of responding to this oddity, where each response presupposes an alternative ontological framework relative to which the response accounts for the oddity by either showing it to rest on an ontological error, as with Grossmann's response, or by mitigating its effect through what purports to be a deeper or wider framework than the original one in which the oddity occurs.