Corporate Governance and Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from the Banking Industry
Corporate Governance and Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from the Banking Industry
复制标题
公司治理与会计稳健性：来自银行业的证据
DOI：
10.1111/corg.12015
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Panagiotis E. Dimitropoulos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Owusu;Stergios Leventis;Panagiotis E. Dimitropoulos
研究问题/议题：在本文中，我们实证调查具有有效公司治理结构的美国上市商业银行是否从事更高水平的保守财务会计和报告。研究结果/见解：我们使用基于市场和权责发生制的稳健性度量，以及综合和分类治理指数，记录了令人信服的证据，表明治理良好的银行在其财务报告实践中显著提高了条件稳健性水平。例如，我们发现，与治理结构无效的银行相比，具有有效治理结构的银行，特别是具有有效董事会和审计治理结构的银行，承认的贷款损失拨备相对于不良贷款的变化更大。理论/学术意义：我们通过提供证据证明具有有效治理结构的银行具有更高水平的会计稳健性，对现有的关于公司治理与会计信息质量之间关系的文献做出了贡献。从业人员/政策影响：本研究的结果将有助于美国银行监管机构/监管者改善现有的监管框架，重点关注会计稳健性，作为公司治理的补充，以减轻困扰银行的不透明和强烈的信息不对称。
Research Question/Issue: In this paper, we empirically investigate whether US listed commercial banks with effective corporate governance structures engage in higher levels of conservative financial accounting and reporting. Research Findings/Insights: Using both market- and accrual-based measures of conservatism and both composite and disaggregated governance indices, we document convincing evidence that well-governed banks engage in significantly higher levels of conditional conservatism in their financial reporting practices. For example, we find that banks with effective governance structures, particularly those with effective board and audit governance structures, recognize loan loss provisions that are larger relative to changes in nonperforming loans compared to their counterparts with ineffective governance structures. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to the extant literature on the relationship between corporate governance and quality of accounting information by providing evidence that banks with effective governance structures practice higher levels of accounting conservatism. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The findings of this study would be useful to US bank regulators/supervisors in improving the existing regulatory framework by focusing on accounting conservatism as a complement to corporate governance in mitigating the opaqueness and intense information asymmetry that plague banks.