Contract choice game of supply chain competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels
Contract choice game of supply chain competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.01.007
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发表时间：
2013-05
影响因子：
12
通讯作者：
Baixun Li;Yongwu Zhou;Ji-zi Li;Shi-ping Zhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Baixun Li;Yongwu Zhou;Ji-zi Li;Shi-ping Zhou
研究了制造商和零售商同时竞争的两条供应链的契约选择博弈问题。作为Stackelberg领导者的两个制造商生产有竞争力的产品，并通过两个共同零售商或独家零售商进行分销，可以选择批发价格或数量折扣合同。我们提出并比较了两种不同类型的合同在不同的场景下的结果，深入探讨供应链结构和竞争在制造商和零售商的水平上的利润和合同选择的两个供应链。研究发现，在普通零售商的情况下，当制造商层面的竞争超过一定值时，制造商的均衡契约将由数量折扣向批发价格转移。与此相反，在独家零售商的情况下，数量折扣合同是优势策略和唯一的纳什均衡的合同选择博弈，无论在制造商和零售商的竞争强度。
This paper investigates the problem of contract choice game of two supply chains, which compete at both manufacturer and retailer levels. The two manufacturers, as Stackelberg leaders, produce competitive products and distribute through two common retailers or exclusive retailers, and can choose either wholesale price or quantity discount contracts. We present and compare the results of two different types of contracts under different scenarios, to explore in depth the effect of supply chain structure and competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels on the profits and contract choices of two supply chains. We find that under the setting of common retailers, when the competition at manufacturer level exceeds a certain value, the equilibrium contract of the manufacturers would shift from quantity discount to wholesale price. In contrast, in the case with exclusive retailers, the quantity discount contract is the dominant strategy and the unique Nash equilibrium of contract choice game regardless of the competitive intensity at both manufacturer and retailer levels.