On the marketing of IPOs
On the marketing of IPOs
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.08.005
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发表时间：
2006-10-01
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
Van Ness, Robert A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cook, Douglas O.;Kieschnick, Robert;Van Ness, Robert A.
Derrien [2005. Journal of Finance 60，487-521]和Ljungqvist等人[2006.商业杂志]建立在工作的米勒[1977年。Journal of Finance 32，1151-1168]并声称发行人和投资银行家的常规客户受益于首次公开募股（IPO）市场中情绪投资者（噪声交易者）的存在。因此，我们认为，投资银行家有动机推动IPO，以吸引情绪投资者进入市场。与这一动机和这些模型相一致，我们预计，投资银行家的促销努力应该影响投资银行家的薪酬，IPO的估值，其初始回报和交易，内部股东的财富收益，以及发行人为随后的增发股票而更换投资银行家的可能性。通过对1993年至2000年的IPO样本数据进行分析，我们发现了与这些预测相一致的证据，因此也与投资银行家向情绪投资者推销IPO的能力是重要的这一命题相一致。(c)2006 Elsevier B. V.保留所有权利。
Derrien [2005. Journal of Finance 60, 487-521] and Ljungqvist et al. [2006. Journal of Business] build upon the work of Miller [1977. Journal of Finance 32, 1151-1168] and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market for an initial public offering (IPO). Thus we argue that investment bankers have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market for it. Consistent with this motivation and these models, we expect that the promotional efforts of investment bankers should influence the compensation of investment bankers, the valuation of an IPO, its initial returns and trading, the wealth gains of insider shareholders, and the likelihood that an issuer switches investment bankers for a subsequent seasoned equity offering. Examining data for a sample of IPOs from 1993 through 2000, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and so with the proposition that an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment investors is important. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.