Out of character: on the creation of virtuous machines
Out of character: on the creation of virtuous machines
复制标题
不符合性格：论创造良性机器
DOI：
10.1007/s10676-012-9290-1
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Ryan Tonkens
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ryan Tonkens
机器伦理学的新兴学科关注于创造自主的人工道德代理人，这些代理人在世界上执行具有伦理意义的行动。最近，Wallach和Allen(道德机器：从错误中教机器人正确，牛津大学出版社，牛津，2009)和其他人认为，基于美德的道德框架是实现这一目标的一个有前途的工具。然而，即使我们可以对自主机器进行编程，使其遵循基于美德的道德框架，在实施和开发阶段之前，也有一些紧迫的伦理问题需要考虑。在这里，我考察了道德伦理学的核心信条是否允许创造有道德的自主机器。有人争辩说，创造这样的机器违反了某些美德伦理学的原则，因此创造和使用这些机器是不允许的。其结果之一是，尽管美德伦理可能在某些近期的机器伦理项目中发挥作用(例如，设计对伦理考虑敏感的系统)，但机器伦理学家需要在其他地方寻找道德框架，以实施到他们自主的人工道德代理人中，尽管沃拉赫和艾伦提出了这一说法。
The emerging discipline of Machine Ethics is concerned with creating autonomous artificial moral agents that perform ethically significant actions out in the world. Recently, Wallach and Allen (Moral machines: teaching robots right from wrong, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) and others have argued that a virtue-based moral framework is a promising tool for meeting this end. However, even if we could program autonomous machines to follow a virtue-based moral framework, there are certain pressing ethical issues that need to be taken into account, prior to the implementation and development stages. Here I examine whether the creation of virtuous autonomous machines is morally permitted by the central tenets of virtue ethics. It is argued that the creation of such machines violates certain tenets of virtue ethics, and hence that the creation and use of those machines is impermissible. One upshot of this is that, although virtue ethics may have a role to play in certain near-term Machine Ethics projects (e.g. designing systems that are sensitive to ethical considerations), machine ethicists need to look elsewhere for a moral framework to implement into their autonomous artificial moral agents, Wallach and Allen’s claims notwithstanding.