Corporate governance and strategic change in SMEs: The effects of ownership, board composition and top management teams
Corporate governance and strategic change in SMEs: The effects of ownership, board composition and top management teams
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DOI：
10.1007/s11187-006-9021-2
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发表时间：
2007-10-01
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Wiklund, Johan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brunninge, Olof;Nordqvist, Mattias;Wiklund, Johan
本文研究了治理机制如何影响中小企业（SMEs）引入战略变革的能力。以前的研究通常假设治理机制相互独立地运行。基于代理理论和小企业治理文献中的见解，我们假设与所有权、董事会和高层管理团队相关的治理变量都会影响战略变革，研究这些治理机制之间的相互作用是很重要的。使用纵向样本的800多家中小企业，我们的一般逻辑和假设支持的分析。我们发现，紧密控股的公司表现出较少的战略变化比中小企业依赖于更广泛的所有权结构。然而，在某种程度上，封闭型公司可以克服这些弱点，并通过利用董事会中的外部董事和/或扩大高层管理团队的规模来实现战略变革。理论和中小企业管理实践的影响进行了讨论。
This paper investigates how governance mechanisms affect the ability of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to introduce strategic change. Previous research typically assumes that governance mechanisms operate independently of each other. Building on agency theory and insights from the literature on small firm governance, we hypothesize that governance variables related to ownership, the board of directors and the top management team all affect strategic change and that it is important to examine the interaction effects of these governance mechanisms. Using a longitudinal sample of over 800 SMEs, our general logic and hypotheses are supported by the analyses. We find that closely held firms exhibit less strategic change than do SMEs relying on more widespread ownership structures. However, to some extent, closely held firms can overcome these weaknesses and achieve strategic change by utilizing outside directors on the board and/or extending the size of the top management teams. Implications for theory and management practice in SMEs are discussed.