Evolution and the Theory of Games
Evolution and the Theory of Games
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DOI：
10.1017/cbo9780511806292
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发表时间：
1982-10
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
John Maynard Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
John Maynard Smith
我想在这篇文章中追溯一个想法的历史。越来越清楚的是，进化论中的一系列问题可以通过修改博弈论来解决。博弈论是冯诺伊曼和摩根斯坦于1944年首次提出的用于分析人类冲突的数学分支。这些问题是多样的，不仅包括动物在竞赛情况下的行为，而且还包括遗传机制和生态系统进化中的一些问题。然而，仅仅接管这一理论是不够的，因为它已经在社会学中发展起来，并将其应用于进化论。在社会学和经济学中，人们假设每个参赛者都通过推理得出应该采用的最佳策略，假设他的对手同样受到理性的指导。这就引出了“极小极大”策略的概念，在这种策略中，参赛者的行为方式是假设他的对手的行为是为了最大化他的损失，从而使他的损失最小化。显然，这不是解决动物冲突的有效方法。必须引入一个新概念，即“进化稳定战略”的概念。
I want in this article to trace the history of an idea. It is beginning to become clear that a range of problems in evolution theory can most appropriately be attacked by a modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts. The problems are diverse and include not only the behaviour of animals in contest situations but also some problems in the evolution of genetic mechanisms and in the evolution of ecosystems. It is not, however, sufficient to take over the theory as it has been developed in sociology and apply it to evolution. In sociology, and in economics, it is supposed that each contestant works out by reasoning the best strategy to adopt, assuming that his opponents are equally guided by reason. This leads to the concept of a ‘minimax’ strategy, in which a contestant behaves in such a way as to minimise his losses on the assumption that his opponent behaves so as to maximise them. Clearly, this would not be a valid approach to animal conflicts. A new concept has to be introduced, the concept of an ‘evolutionary stable strategy’.