Introduction: Regulating the Public Sphere in a Post‐Truth World
Introduction: Regulating the Public Sphere in a
Post‐Truth
World
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简介:后真相世界中的公共领域监管
DOI:
10.1111/1467-923x.13030
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
D. Yarrow
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Fay Niker;D. Yarrow
THIS YEAR marks the fifth anniversary of both the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as US President-political events that shook many people's confidence in ‘business as usual’by exposing deep problems with the nature of democratic politics today. Many of the most alarming problems highlighted by the political events of 2016 concern the epistemic bases of democratic citizenship. Susan Stebbing wrote in 1939, during another moment of political predicament and polarisation, that ‘[t] here is an urgent need today for the citizens of a democracy to think well. It is not enough to have freedom of the press and parliamentary institutions.’1 These words seem apt once again. Recent debates in areas ranging from the cognitive sciences to political theory have contributed to our understanding of individuals’ abilities and failures to ‘think well’. Clearly, for any such abilities to be cultivated, maintained and exercised well, individuals need to be part of an epistemically healthy public sphere-or at least not part of an unhealthy one. Yet, it is precisely worries about the declining health of the public sphere that are at the heart of our present predicament. These include: concerns over ‘fake news’ and the spread of misinformation; erasure of trust in expertise and the advance of ‘alternative facts’ and conspiracy theories; and the role of ‘echo chambers’ and ‘filter bubbles’ in blocking genuine dialogue with others who have different life experiences or worldviews. While these issues first came into sharp focus with the political convulsions of 2016, they have only intensified in the years since. The Cambridge Analytica scandal and its wider fallout, for example, has concentrated debate about the proper role of social media companies (SMCs) in political life. For instance, are SMCs publishers or merely platforms? And to what extent should SMCs be held responsible for moderating the political debates and spread of information that take place on their servers?Likewise, the 2020 US presidential election was characterised by systematic misinformation by the Trump campaign, both before and after the election, aimed at delegitimising the electoral process and preventing the peaceful transfer of power. This culminated in the storming of the US Capitol on 6 January 2021. The response of SMCs to these dramatic developments, firstly with the flagging of content from the Trump campaign and later the ad hoc permanent banning of Trump from many prominent platforms, raised as many questions as it answered. In response, much attention has been directed toward how we might regulate our epistemic environments in order to cure, or at least alleviate, some of these ills. There is a widespread sense, crossingpartypoliticaldivides, thattherearenovel problems with the spaces in which our political debate is situated. The past five years have seen a flurry of initiatives aimed at regulating the circulation of and engagement with political information, and thus reconstructing a healthiermoreinformed, tolerant, inclusive-publicsphere. Manyofthesehavebeenself-regulatoryactionsby SMCs, such as Facebook's ‘third-party factchecking program’and Twitter's ‘civic integrity’and ‘synthetic and manipulated media’policies. 2 Whatever their individual merits, these regulatory responses have generally been reactive and piecemeal. It is now clear that the task is not simply to repair a temporary rupture in the public sphere, but rather to respond to its qualitative and permanent transformation-